An agent model for business relationships by Debenham, John & Sierra, Carles
An Agent Model of Business Relationships
John Debenham1 and Carles Sierra2
1 QCIS, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
debenham@it.uts.edu.au
2 Institut d’Investigacio´ en Intel lige`ncia Artificial - IIIA,
Spanish Scientific Research Council, CSIC
08193 Bellaterra, Catalonia, Spain
sierra@iiia.csic.es
Abstract. Relationships are fundamental to all but the most impersonal forms of
interaction in business. An agent aims to secure projected needs by attempting to
build a set of (business) relationships with other agents. A relationship is built by
exchanging private information, and is characterised by its intimacy — degree of
closeness — and balance — degree of fairness. Each argumentative interaction
between two agents then has two goals: to satisfy some immediate need, and to
do so in a way that develops the relationship in a desired direction. An agent’s
desire to develop each relationship in a particular way then places constraints
on the argumentative utterances. This paper describes argumentative interaction
constrained by a desire to develop such relationships.
1 Introduction
Modelling long-term (business) relationships underpins the evolution of trust relation-
ships. A basis for agent interaction is presented that manages the (business) relation-
ships that an agent has with each agent that it interacts with. Our agent summaries its
relationships using ‘intimacy’ and ‘balance’ measures. Its actions are then shaped by its
desired values for these two measures that represent its foreseeable social aspirations,
and are called the ‘target intimacy’ and ‘target balance’. Given all of this, a particular
interaction with another agent is approached both with the goal of negotiating towards a
satisfactory conclusion, and as an opportunity to do so in a way that gradually develops
the relationship towards its target. In this way the agent’s target aspirations constrain
and shape its argumentative behaviour in relationship-based argumentation.
Negotiation dialogues are traditionally organised around the basic illocutionary par-
ticles: Offer, Accept and Reject. Previous work has been centred on the design of nego-
tiation strategies and on proposing agent architectures able to deal with the exchange of
offers [1,2]. Game theory [3], possibilistic logic [4] and first-order logic [5] have been
used for this purpose. Some initial steps in proposing rhetoric particles have been made,
especially around the idea of appeals, rewards and threats [6]. Expanded negotiation di-
alogues, including these and other rhetoric moves, are known as argumentation-based
negotiations. Argumentation in this sense is mainly to do with building (business) re-
lationships. When we reward or threaten we refer to a future instant of time where the
reward or threat will be effective, its scope goes beyond the current negotiation round.
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This paper is in the area labelled: information-based agency [7]. An information-
based agent has an identity, values, needs, plans and strategies all of which are ex-
pressed using a fixed ontology in probabilistic logic for internal representation and in
an illocutionary language for communication. We assume that such an agent resides in
a electronic institution [8] and is aware of the prevailing norms and interaction proto-
cols. An information-based agent makes no a priori assumptions about the states of the
world or the other agents in it — these are represented in a world model,Mt, that is in-
ferred solely from the messages that it receives. The intuition behind information-based
agency is that all illocutionary acts give away (valuable) information.
An agent’s world model, Mt, is a set of probability distributions for a set of random
variables each of which represents the agent’s expectations about some point of interest
about the world or the other agents in it. Each incoming utterance is translated into a set
of (linear) constraints on one or more of these distributions, and then the posterior state
of the world model is estimated using entropy-based inference. These distributions are
the foundation for the agent’s reasoning.
A pair of agents interact by passing messages to each other. We assume that they
share a common ontology and that their interactions are organised into dialogues, where
a dialogue is a finite sequence of inter-related utterances. A commitment is a conse-
quence of an utterance by an agent that contains a promise that the world will be in
some state in the future. A contract is a pair of commitments exchanged between a
pair1 of agents. The set of all dialogues between two agents up to the present is their
relationship. This discussion is from the point of view of an information-based agent α
in a multiagent system where α interacts with negotiating agents, βi, information pro-
viding agents, θj , and an institutional agent, ξ, that represents the institution where we
assume that all interactions happen [8]: {α,β1, . . . ,βo, ξ, θ1, . . . , θt}.
Our communication model is described in Section 2. Relationships are formalised
in Section 3, and the agent architecture in Section 4. Section 6 describes an elaborate
means of measuring the intimacy — degree of closeness — and balance – degree of
fairness — that are based on measures of the information in any utterance. Section 7
describes the argumentation framework, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Communication Model
The communication language is detailed below; we assume that utterances in the
communication language may be classified into unique illocutionary categories2 L =
{li}Li=1. In order to structure agent dialogues we also need an ontology that includes a
(minimum) repertoire of elements: a set of concepts (e.g. quantity, quality, material) or-
ganised in a is-a hierarchy (e.g. platypus is a mammal, Australian-dollar is a currency),
and a set of relations over these concepts (e.g. price(beer,AUD)).3 We model ontologies
following an algebraic approach [9] and an ontology is a tupleO = (C,R,≤,σ) where:
1 Sets of commitments between more than two agents are not considered here.
2 In a simple bargaining scenario these utterances could be: “propose”, “accept” and “reject”.
3 Usually, a set of axioms defined over the concepts and relations is also required. We will omit
this here.
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1. C is a finite set of concept symbols (including basic data types);
2. R is a finite set of relation symbols;
3. ≤ is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation on C (a partial order)
4. σ : R→ C+ is the function assigning to each relation symbol its arity
where≤ is the traditional is-a hierarchy. To simplify computations in the computing of
probability distributions we assume that there is a number of disjoint is-a trees covering
different ontological spaces (e.g. a tree for types of fabric, a tree for shapes of clothing,
and so on). R contains relations between the concepts in the hierarchy, this is needed
to define ‘objects’ (e.g. deals) that are defined as a tuple of issues. We then analyse
dialogues in terms of the dialogical framework L×O.
The semantic distance between concepts within an ontology depends on how far
away they are in the structure defined by the ≤ relation. Semantic distance plays a
fundamental role in strategies for information-based agency. How signed contracts,
Commit(·), about objects in a particular semantic region, and their execution,Done(·),
affect our decision making process about signing future contracts in nearby semantic re-
gions is crucial to modelling the common sense that human beings apply in managing
trading relationships. A measure [10] bases the semantic similarity between two con-
cepts on the path length induced by≤ (more distance in the≤ graph means less seman-
tic similarity), and the depth of the subsumer concept (common ancestor) in the shortest
path between the two concepts (the deeper in the hierarchy, the closer the meaning of
the concepts). Semantic similarity is then defined as:
δ(c, c′) = e−κ1l · e
κ2h − e−κ2h
eκ2h + e−κ2h
where e = 2.71828, l is the length (i.e. number of hops) of the shortest path between the
concepts, h is the depth of the deepest concept subsuming both concepts, and κ1 and
κ2 are parameters scaling the contributions of the shortest path length and the depth
respectively.
The shape of the language that α uses to represent the information received and
the content of its dialogues depends on two fundamental notions. First, when agents
interact within an overarching institution they explicitly or implicitly accept the norms
that will constrain their behaviour, and accept the established sanctions and penalties
whenever norms are violated. Second, the dialogues in whichα engages are built around
two fundamental actions: (i) passing information, and (ii) exchanging proposals and
contracts. A contract δ = (a, b) between agentsα and β is a pair where a and b represent
the actions that agents α and β are responsible for respectively. Contracts signed by
agents and information passed by agents, are similar to norms in the sense that they
oblige agents to behave in a particular way, so as to satisfy the conditions of the contract,
or to make the world consistent with the information passed. Contracts and Information
can thus be thought of as normative statements that restrict an agent’s behaviour.
Norms, contracts, and information have an obvious temporal dimension. Thus, an
agent has to abide by a norm while it is inside an institution, a contract has a validity
period, and a piece of information is true only during an interval in time. The set of
norms affecting the behaviour of an agent defines the context that the agent has to take
into account.
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α’s communication language has two fundamental primitives: Commit(α,β,ϕ) to
represent, in ϕ, the world that α aims at bringing about and that β has the right to
verify, complain about or claim compensation for any deviations from, and Done(µ) to
represent the event that a certain action µ4 has taken place. In this way, norms, contracts,
and information chunks will be represented as instances of Commit(·) where α and β
can be individual agents or institutions. C is:
µ ::= illoc(α,β,ϕ, t) | µ;µ |
Let context InµEnd
ϕ ::= term | Done(µ) | Commit(α,β,ϕ) | ϕ ∧ ϕ |
ϕ ∨ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∀v.ϕv | ∃v.ϕv
context ::= ϕ | id = ϕ | prolog clause | context; context
where ϕv is a formula with free variable v, illoc is any appropriate set of illocutionary
particles, ‘;’ means sequencing, and context represents either previous agreements, pre-
vious illocutions, the ontological working context, that is a projection of the ontological
trees that represent the focus of the conversation, or code that aligns the ontological dif-
ferences between the speakers needed to interpret an action a. Representing an ontology
as a set predicates in Prolog is simple. The set term contains instances of the ontology
concepts and relations.5
For example, we can represent the following offer: “If you spend a total of more than
e100 in my shop during October then I will give you a 10% discount on all goods in
November”, as:
Offer( α, β,spent(β, α, October, X) ∧ X ≥ e100 →
∀ y. Done(Inform(ξ, α, pay(β, α, y), November))→
Commit(α, β, discount(y,10%)))
ξ is an institution agent that reports the payment.
3 Relationships
There is evidence from psychological studies that humans seek a balance in their ne-
gotiation relationships. The classical view [11] is that people perceive resource alloca-
tions as being distributively fair (i.e. well balanced) if they are proportional to inputs or
contributions (i.e. equitable). However, more recent studies [12,13] show that humans
follow a richer set of norms of distributive justice depending on their intimacy level:
equity, equality, and need. Equity being the allocation proportional to the effort (e.g. the
profit of a company goes to the stock holders proportional to their investment), equality
being the allocation in equal amounts (e.g. two friends eat the same amount of a cake
cooked by one of them), and need being the allocation proportional to the need for the
4 Without loss of generality we will assume that all actions are dialogical.
5 We assume the convention that C(c) means that c is an instance of concept C and
r(c1, . . . , cn) implicitly determines that ci is an instance of the concept in the i-th position
of the relation r.
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resource (e.g. in case of food scarcity, a mother gives all food to her baby). For instance,
if we are in a purely economic setting (low intimacy) we might request equity for the
Options dimension but could accept equality in the Goals dimension.
The perception of a relation being in balance (i.e. fair) depends strongly on the na-
ture of the social relationships between individuals (i.e. the intimacy level). In purely
economical relationships (e.g., business), equity is perceived as more fair; in relations
where joint action or fostering of social relationships are the goal (e.g. friends), equal-
ity is perceived as more fair; and in situations where personal development or personal
welfare are the goal (e.g. family), allocations are usually based on need.
We believe that the perception of balance in dialogues (in negotiation or otherwise)
is grounded on social relationships, and that every dimension of an interaction between
humans can be correlated to the social closeness, or intimacy, between the parties in-
volved. According to the previous studies, the more intimacy across the illocutionary
categories the more the need norm is used, and the less intimacy the more the equity
norm is used. This might be part of our social evolution. There is ample evidence that
when human societies evolved from a hunter-gatherer structure6 to a shelter-based one7
the probability of survival increased when food was scarce.
In this context, we can clearly see that, for instance, families exchange not only
goods but also information and knowledge based on need, and that few families would
consider their relationships as being unbalanced, and thus unfair, when there is a strong
asymmetry in the exchanges (a mother explaining everything to her children, or buying
toys, does not expect reciprocity). In the case of partners there is some evidence [14] that
the allocations of goods and burdens (i.e. positive and negative utilities) are perceived
as fair, or in balance, based on equity for burdens and equality for goods. See Table 1
for some examples of desired balances along five illocutionary categories.
Table 1. Some desired balances (sense of fairness) for five illocutionary categories
Illoc. Category A new trading partner my butcher my boss my partner my children
Legitimacy equity equity equity equality need
Options equity equity equity mixeda need
Goals equity need equity need need
Independence equity equity equality need need
Commitment equity equity equity mixed need
a equity on burden, equality on good
The perceived balance in a negotiation dialogue allows negotiators to infer infor-
mation about their opponent, about its stance, and to compare their relationships with
all negotiators. For instance, if we perceive that every time we request information it
is provided, and that no significant questions are returned, or no complaints about not
6 In its purest form, individuals in these societies collect food and consume it when and where
it is found. This is a pure equity sharing of the resources, the gain is proportional to the effort.
7 In these societies there are family units, around a shelter, that represent the basic food sharing
structure. Usually, food is accumulated at the shelter for future use. Then the food intake
depends more on the need of the members.
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receiving information are given, then that probably means that our opponent perceives
our social relationship to be very close. Alternatively, we can detect what issues are
causing a burden to our opponent by observing an imbalance in the information or util-
itarian senses on that issue.
4 Agent Architecture
A multiagent system {α,β1, . . . ,βn, ξ, θ1, . . . , θt}, contains an agent α that interacts
with other argumentation agents, βi, information providing agents, θj , and an institu-
tional agent, ξ, that represents the institution where we assume the interactions happen
[8]. The institutional agent reports promptly and honestly on what actually occurs af-
ter an agent signs a contract, or makes some other form of commitment. In Section 5
this enables us to measure the difference between an utterance and a subsequent obser-
vation. Agents have a probabilistic first-order internal language L used to represent a
world model,Mt. A generic information-based architecture is described in detail in [7].
The agent architecture is shown in Figure 1. Agent α acts in response to a need that
is expressed in terms of the ontology. Needs trigger α’s goal/plan proactive reasoning,
while other messages are dealt with by α’s reactive reasoning.8 Each plan prepares
for the negotiation by assembling the contents of a ‘briefcase’ that the agent ‘carries’
into the negotiation9. The relationship strategy determines which agent to negotiate
with for a given need; it uses risk management analysis to preserve a strategic set of
trading relationships for each mission-critical need — this is not detailed here. For each
trading relationship this strategy generates a relationship target that is expressed in the
dialogical framework as a desired level of intimacy to be achieved in the long term.
Each negotiation consists of a dialogue, Ψ t, between two agents with agent α con-
tributing utterance µ and the partner β contributing µ′. Each dialogue, Ψ t, is evaluated
using the dialogical framework in terms of the value of Ψ t to both α and β — see Sec-
tion 6.2. The negotiation strategy then determines the current set of offers {δi}, and
then the tactics, guided by the negotiation target, decide which, if any, of these offers
to put forward and wraps them in argumentation dialogue — see Section 7. We now
describe two of the distributions in Mt that support offer exchange.
Pt(acc(α,β,χ, δ)) estimates the probability that α should accept proposal δ in sat-
isfaction of her need χ, where δ = (a, b) is a pair of commitments, a for α and b for
β. α will accept δ if: Pt(acc(α,β,χ, δ)) > c, for level of certainty c. This estimate is
compounded from subjective and objective views of acceptability. The subjective esti-
mate takes account of: the extent to which the enactment of δ will satisfy α’s need χ,
how much δ is ‘worth’ to α, and the extent to which α believes that she will be in a
position to execute her commitment a [7]. Sα(β, a) is a random variable denoting α’s
estimate of β’s subjective valuation of a over some finite, numerical evaluation space.
8 Each of α’s plans and reactions contain constructors for an initial world modelMt.Mt is
then maintained from percepts received using update functions that transform percepts into
constraints onMt — for details, see [7].
9 Empirical evidence shows that in human negotiation, better outcomes are achieved by skewing
the opening offer in favour of the proposer. We are unaware of any empirical investigation of
this hypothesis for autonomous agents in real trading scenarios.
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Fig. 1. The agent architecture
The objective estimate captures whether δ is acceptable on the open market, and vari-
able Uα(b) denotes α’s open-market valuation of the enactment of commitment b, again
taken over some finite numerical valuation space. We also consider needs, the variable
Tα(β, a) denotes α’s estimate of the strength of β’s motivating need for the enactment
of commitment a over a valuation space. Then for δ = (a, b): Pt(acc(α,β,χ, δ)) =
Pt
((
Tα(β, a)
Tα(α, b)
)h
×
(
Sα(α, b)
Sα(β, a)
)g
× Uα(b)
Uα(a)
≥ s
)
(1)
where g ∈ [0, 1] is α’s greed, h ∈ [0, 1] is α’s degree of altruism, and s ≈ 1 is derived
from the stance10 described in Section 7. The parameters g and h are independent. We
can imagine a relationship that begins with g = 1 and h = 0. Then as the agents share
increasing amounts of their information about their open market valuations g gradually
reduces to 0, and then as they share increasing amounts of information about their needs
h increases to 1. The basis for the acceptance criterion has thus developed from equity
to equality, and then to need.
Pt(acc(β,α, δ)) estimates the probability that β would accept δ, by observing β’s
responses. For example, if β sends the message Offer(δ1) then α derives the constraint:
{Pt(acc(β,α, δ1)) = 1} on the distribution Pt(β,α, δ), and if this is a counter offer
to a former offer of α’s, δ0, then: {Pt(acc(β,α, δ0)) = 0}. In the not-atypical special
case of multi-issue bargaining where the agents’ preferences over the individual issues
only are known and are complementary to each other’s, maximum entropy reasoning
can be applied to estimate the probability that any multi-issue δ will be acceptable to β
by enumerating the possible worlds that represent β’s “limit of acceptability” [16].
10 If α chooses to inflate her opening offer then this is achieved in Section 7 by increasing the
value of s. If s ! 1 then a deal may not be possible. This illustrates the well-known ineffi-
ciency of bilateral bargaining established analytically by [15].
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5 Updating the World ModelMt
α’s world model consists of probability distributions that represent its uncertainty in
the world state. α is interested in the degree to which an utterance accurately describes
what will subsequently be observed. All observations about the world are received as
utterances from an all-truthful institution agent ξ. For example, if β communicates the
goal “I am hungry” and the subsequent negotiation terminates with β purchasing a
book from α (by ξ advising α that a certain amount of money has been credited to α’s
account) then α may conclude that the goal that β chose to satisfy was something other
than hunger. So, α’s world model contains probability distributions that represent its
uncertain expectations of what will be observed on the basis of utterances received.
We represent the relationship between utterance, ϕ, and subsequent observation, ϕ′,
by Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) ∈ Mt, where ϕ′ and ϕ may be ontological categories in the interest of
computational feasibility. For example, if ϕ is “I will deliver a bucket of fish to you
tomorrow” then the distribution P(ϕ′|ϕ) need not be over all possible things that β
might do, but could be over ontological categories that summarise β’s possible actions.
In the absence of in-coming utterances, the conditional probabilities, Pt(ϕ′|ϕ),
should tend to ignorance as represented by a decay limit distribution D(ϕ′|ϕ). α may
have background knowledge concerning D(ϕ′|ϕ) as t → ∞, otherwise α may assume
that it has maximum entropy whilst being consistent with the data. In general, given a
distribution, Pt(Xi), and a decay limit distribution D(Xi), Pt(Xi) decays by:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (2)
where∆i is the decay function for theXi satisfying the property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) =
D(Xi). For example, ∆i could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1− νi)×D(Xi)+ νi×Pt(Xi),
where νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Either the decay function or the
decay limit distribution could also be a function of time: ∆ti and Dt(Xi).
Suppose that α receives an utterance µ = illoc(α,β,ϕ, t) from agent β at time t.
Suppose that α attaches an epistemic belief Rt(α,β, µ) to µ — this probability takes
account of α’s level of personal caution. We model the update of Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) in two cases,
one for observations given ϕ, second for observations given φ in the semantic neigh-
bourhood of ϕ.
First, if {ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕm} is the set of all possible observations and ϕk is observed
then α may set Pt+1(ϕk|ϕ) to some value d. We estimate the complete posterior dis-
tribution Pt+1(ϕ′|ϕ) by applying the principle of minimum relative entropy as follows.
Let p(µ) be the distribution: argminx
∑
j xj log
xj
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)j that satisfies the constraint
p(µ)k = d. Then let q(µ) be the distribution:
q(µ) = Rt(α,β, µ) × p(µ) + (1− Rt(α,β, µ)) × Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)
and then let:
r(µ) =
{
q(µ) if q(µ) is more interesting than Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) otherwise
A measure of whether q(µ) is more interesting than Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) is: K(q(µ)‖D(ϕ′|ϕ)) >
K(Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)‖D(ϕ′|ϕ)), whereK(x‖y) =∑j xj ln xjyj is the Kullback-Leibler distance
between two probability distributions x and y.
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Finally incorporating Equation 2 we obtain the method for updating a distribution
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) on receipt of a message µ:
Pt+1(ϕ′|ϕ) = ∆i(D(ϕ′|ϕ), r(µ)) (3)
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two probabilities: first, the proba-
bility z in the utterance µ, and second the belief Rt(α,β, µ) that α attached to µ.
Second we consider the update of Pt(φ′|φ) given ϕ. Given µ = illoc(α,β,ϕ, t) and
the observation ϕk we define the vector t by
ti = Pt(φi|φ) + (1− | Sim(ϕk,ϕ)− Sim(φi,φ) |) · Sim(ϕk,φ)
with {φ1,φ2, . . . ,φp} the set of all possible observations in the context of φ and i =
1, . . . , p. t is not a probability distribution. The multiplying factor Sim(ϕ′,φ) limits the
variation of probability to those formulae whose ontological context is not too far away
from the observation. The posterior Pt+1(φ′|φ) is obtained with Equation 3 with r(µ)
defined to be the normalisation of t.
6 Measuring the Confidence in a Relationship
A dialogue, Ψ t, between agents α and β is a sequence of inter-related utterances in
context. A relationship,Ψ∗t, is a sequence of dialogues. We first measure the confidence
that an agent has for another by observing, for each utterance, the difference between
what is said (the utterance) and what subsequently occurs (the observation). Second
we evaluate each dialogue as it progresses in terms of the dialogical framework —
this evaluation employs the confidence measures. Finally we define the intimacy of a
relationship as an aggregation of the value of its component dialogues.
6.1 Confidence
Confidence measures generalise what are commonly called trust, reliability and repu-
tation measures [17] into a single computational framework that spans the illocutionary
categories C. In Section 6.2 confidence measures are applied to valuing fulfilment of
promises, to the execution of commitments, and to valuing dialogues.
Ideal observations. Consider a distribution of observations that represent α’s “ideal”
in the sense that it is the best that α could reasonably expect to observe. This distri-
bution will be a function of α’s context with β denoted by e, and is PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e). Here
we measure the relative entropy between this ideal distribution, PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e), and the
distribution of expected observations, Pt(ϕ′|ϕ). That is:
C(α,β,ϕ) = 1−
∑
ϕ′
PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e) log
PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e)
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) (4)
where the “1” is an arbitrarily chosen constant being the maximum value that this mea-
sure may have. This equation measures confidence for a single statement ϕ. It makes
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sense to aggregate these values over a class of statements, say over those ϕ that are in
the ontological context o, that is ϕ ≤ o:
C(α,β, o) = 1−
∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ) [1− C(α,β,ϕ)]∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ)
where Ptβ(ϕ) is a probability distribution over the space of statements that the next
statement β will make to α is ϕ. Similarly, for an overall estimate of β’s confidence in
α:
C(α,β) = 1−
∑
ϕ
Ptβ(ϕ) [1− C(α,β,ϕ)]
Preferred observations. The previous measure requires that: PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e), has to be
specified for each ϕ. Here we measure the extent to which the observation ϕ′ is prefer-
able to the original statement ϕ. Given a predicate Prefer(c1, c2, e) meaning that α
prefers c1 to c2 in environment e. Then if ϕ ≤ o:
C(α,β,ϕ) =
∑
ϕ′
Pt(Prefer(ϕ′,ϕ, o))Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)
and:
C(α,β, o) =
∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ)C(α,β,ϕ)∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ)
Certainty in observation. Here we measure the consistency in expected acceptable
observations, or “the lack of expected uncertainty in those possible observations that
are better than the original statement”.
If ϕ ≤ o let: Φ+(ϕ, o,κ) = {ϕ′ | Pt(Prefer(ϕ′,ϕ, o)) > κ} for some constant κ,
and:
C(α,β,ϕ) = 1 + 1
B∗
·
∑
ϕ′∈Φ+(ϕ,o,κ)
Pt+(ϕ′|ϕ) log Pt+(ϕ′|ϕ)
where Pt+(ϕ′|ϕ) is the normalisation of Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) for ϕ′ ∈ Φ+(ϕ, o,κ),
B∗ =
{
1 if |Φ+(ϕ, o,κ)| = 1
log |Φ+(ϕ, o,κ)| otherwise
As above we aggregate this measure for observations in a particular context o, and
measure confidence as before.
Computational Note. The various measures given above involve extensive calcula-
tions. For example, Equation 4 contains
∑
ϕ′ that sums over all possible observations
ϕ′. We obtain a more computationally friendly measure by appealing to the structure of
the ontology described, and the right-hand side of Equation 4 may be approximated to:
1−
∑
ϕ′:Sim(ϕ′,ϕ)≥η
Ptη,I(ϕ′|ϕ, e) log
Ptη,I(ϕ′|ϕ, e)
Ptη(ϕ′|ϕ)
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where Ptη,I(ϕ′|ϕ, e) is the normalisation of PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e) for Sim(ϕ′,ϕ) ≥ η, and sim-
ilarly for Ptη(ϕ′|ϕ). The extent of this calculation is controlled by the parameter η. An
even tighter restriction may be obtained with: Sim(ϕ′,ϕ) ≥ η and ϕ′ ≤ ψ for some ψ.
6.2 Valuing Negotiation Dialogues
Suppose that a negotiation commences at time s, and by time t a string of utterances,
Φt = 〈µ1, . . . , µn〉 has been exchanged between agent α and agent β. This negotiation
dialogue is evaluated by α in the context of α’s world model at time s, Ms, and the
environment e that includes utterances that may have been received from other agents
in the system including the information sources {θi}. Let Ψ t = (Φt,Ms, e), then α
estimates the value of this dialogue to itself in the context of Ms and e as a 2×L array
Vα(Ψ t) where:
Vx(Ψ t) =
(
I l1x (Ψ t) . . . I lLx (Ψ t)
U l1x (Ψ t) . . . U lLx (Ψ t)
)
where the I(·) and U(·) functions are information-based and utility-based measures
respectively as we now describe. α estimates the value of this dialogue to β as Vβ(Ψ t)
by assuming that β’s reasoning apparatus mirrors its own.
In general terms, the information-based valuations measure the reduction in uncer-
tainty, or information gain, that the dialogue gives to each agent, they are expressed in
terms of decrease in entropy that can always be calculated. The utility-based valuations
measure utility gain are expressed in terms of “some suitable” utility evaluation func-
tion U(·) that can be difficult to define. This is one reason why the utilitarian approach
has no natural extension to the management of argumentation that is achieved here by
our information-based approach.
The balance in a negotiation dialogue, Ψ t, is defined as: Bαβ(Ψ t) = Vα(Ψ t) 0
Vβ(Ψ t) for an element-by-element difference operator 0 that respects the structure of
V (Ψ t). The intimacy between agents α and β, I∗tαβ , is the pattern of the two 2 × L
arrays V ∗tα and V ∗tβ that are computed by an update function as each negotiation round
terminates, I∗tαβ =
(
V ∗tα , V ∗tβ
)
. If Ψ t terminates at time t:
V ∗t+1x = ν × Vx(Ψ t) + (1− ν)× V ∗tx (5)
where ν is the learning rate, and x = α,β. Additionally, V ∗tx continually decays by:
V ∗t+1x = τ × V ∗tx + (1 − τ) × Dx, where x = α,β; τ is the decay rate, and Dx is a
2 × L array being the decay limit distribution for the value to agent x of the intimacy
of the relationship in the absence of any interaction. Dx is the reputation of agent x.
The relationship balance between agents α and β is: B∗tαβ = V ∗tα 0 V ∗tβ . In particular,
the intimacy determines values for the parameters g and h in Equation 1. As a simple
example, if both IOα (Ψ∗t) and IOβ (Ψ∗t) increase then g decreases, and as the remaining
information-based components increase, h increases.
The notion of balance may be applied to pairs of utterances by treating them as de-
generate dialogues. In simple multi-issue bargaining the equitable information revela-
tion strategy generalises the tit-for-tat strategy in single-issue bargaining, and extends to
a tit-for-tat argumentation strategy by applying the same principle across the dialogical
framework.
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7 Strategies and Tactics for Building Relationships
Each negotiation has to achieve two goals. First it may be intended to achieve some
contractual outcome. Second it will aim to contribute to the growth, or decline, of the
relationship intimacy.
We now describe in greater detail the contents of the “Negotiation” box in Figure 1.
The negotiation literature consistently advises that an agent’s behaviour should not be
predictable even in close, intimate relationships. The required variation of behaviour
is normally described as varying the negotiation stance that informally varies from
“friendly guy” to “tough guy”. The stance is shown in Figure 1, it injects bounded
random noise into the process, where the bound tightens as intimacy increases. The
stance, Stαβ , is a 2× L matrix of randomly chosen multipliers, each ≈ 1, that perturbs
α’s actions. The value in the (x, y) position in the matrix, where x = I, U and y ∈ L,
is chosen at random from [ 1l(I∗tαβ ,x,y) , l(I
∗t
αβ , x, y)] where l(I∗tαβ , x, y) is the bound, and
I∗tαβ is the intimacy.
The negotiation strategy is concerned with maintaining a working set of proposals. If
the set of proposals is empty then α will quit the negotiation. α perturbs the acceptance
machinery (see Section 4) by deriving s from the Stαβ matrix. In line with the comment
in Footnote 9, in the early stages of the negotiation α may decide to inflate her opening
offer. This is achieved by increasing the value of s in Equation 1. The following strategy
uses the machinery described in Section 4. Fix h, g, s and c, set the Proposals to the
empty set, let Dts = {δ | Pt(acc(α,β,χ, δ) > c}, then:
– repeat the following as many times as desired: add δ=argmaxx{Pt(acc(β,α, x)) |
x ∈ Dts} to Proposals, remove {y ∈ Dts | Sim(y, δ) < k} for some k from Dts
By using Pt(acc(β,α, δ)) this strategy reacts to β’s history of Propose and Reject ut-
terances.
Negotiation tactics are concerned with selecting some offers and wrapping them in
argumentation. Prior interactions with agent β will have produced an intimacy pattern
expressed in the form of
(
V ∗tα , V ∗tβ
)
. Suppose that the relationship target is (T ∗tα , T ∗tβ ).
Following from Equation 5, α will want to achieve a negotiation target, Nβ(Ψ t) such
that: ν ·Nβ(Ψ t) + (1− ν) · V ∗tβ is “a bit on the T ∗tβ side of” V ∗tβ :
Nβ(Ψ t) =
ν − κ
ν
V ∗tβ ⊕
κ
ν
T ∗tβ (6)
for small κ ∈ [0, ν] that represents α’s desired rate of development for her relationship
with β. Nβ(Ψ t) is a 2×Lmatrix containing variations in the dialogical framework’s di-
mensions that α would like to reveal to β during Ψ t (e.g. I’ll pass a bit more information
on options than usual, I’ll be stronger in concessions on options, etc.). It is reasonable
to expect β to progress towards her target at the same rate and Nα(Ψ t) is calculated by
replacing β by α in Equation 6. Nα(Ψ t) is what α hopes to receive from β during Ψ t.
This gives a negotiation balance target of: Nα(Ψ t) 0 Nβ(Ψ t) that can be used as the
foundation for reactive tactics by striving to maintain this balance across the dialogical
framework. A cautious tactic could use the balance to bound the response µ to each
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utterance µ′ from β by the constraint: Vα(µ′)0 Vβ(µ) ≈ Stαβ ⊗ (Nα(Ψ t)0Nβ(Ψ t)),
where ⊗ is element-by-element matrix multiplication, and Stαβ is the stance. A less
neurotic tactic could attempt to achieve the target negotiation balance over the antici-
pated complete dialogue. If a balance bound requires negative information revelation in
one dialogical framework category then α will contribute nothing to it, and will leave
this to the natural decay to the reputation D as described above.
The following are a list of components that we have described that could be com-
bined into an agent’s negotiation strategy. These components all constrain the agent’s
actions. We assume that they are all soft constraints and that they operate together with
a hard constraint Ct(α,β, xt) on the message xt that α may send to β at time t.
Information-based strategies. Every communication gives away information and so
has the potential to contribute to the intimacy and balance of a relationship. Information-
based strategies manage the information revelation process. Let M tαβ be the set of time-
stamped messages that α has sent to β, and M tβα likewise both at time t. Mt is α’s
world model at time t and consists of a set of probability distributions. xt denotes a
message received at time t. It(α,β, xt) is the information gain — measured as the re-
duction of the entropy of Mt — observed by α after receiving message xt. It(β,α, xt)
is α’s estimate of β’s information gain after receiving message xt from α.
The complete information history of both the observed and the estimated information
gain, Gt(α,β), is:
Gt(α,β) = {(xs, Is(α,β, xs)) | xs ∈M tβα} ∪
{(xs, Is(β,α, xs)) | xs ∈M tαβ}
respectively.
In [7] we described to the model that α constructs of β. In general α can not be ex-
pected to guess β’s world model,Mtβ , unless α knows what β’s needs are — even then,
α would only knowMtβ with certainty if it knew what plans β had chosen. However, α
always knows the private information that it has sent to β — for example, in Propose(·)
and Reject(·) messages. Such private information could be used by β to estimate α’s
probability of accepting a proposal: Ptβ(acc(α,β,χ′, z)), where χ′ is the need that β
believes α to have.
α’s information-based strategies constrain its actions, xt, on the basis of It(β,α, xt)
and its relation to Gt(α,β). For example, the strategy that gives β greatest expected
information gain:
argmax
z
{ Isβ(β,α, z) | Ct(α,β, z)}
More generally, for some function f :
argmax
z
{ f(Isβ(β,α, z), Gt(α,β)) | Ct(α,β, z)}
the idea being that the f ‘optimises’ in some sense the information gain taking account
of the interaction history.
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Ontology-based strategies. The structure of the ontology may be used to manage
the information revelation process in particular strategic areas. For example, α may
prefer to build a relationship with β in the context of the supply of particular goods
only [9]. The structure of the ontology is provided by the Sim(·) function. Given two
contracts δ and δ′ containing concepts {o1, . . . , oi} and {o′1, . . . , o′j} respectively, the
(non-symmetric) distance of δ′ from δ is the vector
Γ (δ, δ′) = (dk : o′′k)
i
k=1
where dk = minx{Sim(ok, o′x) | x = 1, . . . , j}, o′′k = sup(argminx{Sim(ok, x) |
x = o′1, . . . , o′j}, ok) and the function sup(·, ·) is the supremum of two concepts in the
ontology. Γ (δ, δ′) quantifies how different δ′ is to δ and enables α to “work around” or
“move away from” a contract under consideration. In general for some function g;
argmax
z
{ g(Γ (z, xs)) | xs ∈M tαβ ∪M tβα ∧ Ct(α,β, z)}
the idea being that the g ‘optimises’ in some sense the ontological relationship with the
interaction history.
8 Discussion
The ability of agents to conduct business relies on their ability to build business relation-
ships with each other. In this paper we have introduced a novel approach to negotiation
that incorporates a rich model of relationships that is dimensioned by the structure of the
ontology and a set of illocutionary categories. It is grounded on business and psycho-
logical studies and introduces the concepts of intimacy and balance as key elements in
understanding what is a negotiation strategy and tactic. Relationships are strengthened
by managing the agent’s dialogical moves. Each dialogical move produces a change in
an array structure. The current balance and intimacy levels and the desired, or target,
levels are then used by the tactics to determine what to say next. The architecture is sim-
ple and the implementation of the agents straightforward using tools from information
theory.
We are currently exploring the use of this model as an extension of a currently
widespread eProcurement software commercialised by a spin-off company of the labo-
ratory of one of the authors. This tool has only a utilitarian modelling of the negotiation
interactions and has motivated some criticisms from its users about the lack of mod-
elling of long-lasting relationships that our model could solve.
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